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1
A piloted sizul.ation of the CM Block II entry has been conducted to
evaluate the feasibility of using the entry monitor system (EMS) as
a backup ranging device in the event of a primary GO malfunction.
The results of the study indicate that the addition of some back-ap
ranging lines on the EMS scroll provides the crew with the capability
of maneuvering the spacecraft to a preselected landing site following
a G&N failure. Action has been taken to try and have these backup
M	 ranging l;L'nes' included 'In . the ' Block 'II Chi series. " Siku l.ation results
Indicated that there is an	 probability that the spacecraft %ill
land within 161 n. mi. of the mean miss distance (50 n. mi.) if the
pilot uses the FMS backup mode for entry ranging.
. .	 f .1
INTRODUCTION
2
The Block II CM has an EMS that will be used to monitor pri-
mary guidance and navigation(G&N) during the atmospheric entry
portion of the mission. The EMS provides a simple but highly
reliable means for the crew to monitor CM entry while in the
automatic or manual G&N modes. In the past, there have been
man-in-the-loop simulations conducted at Wth MSC and NAA
where the EMS has been evaluated ,as m. means• of detecting G&N
me:lflmctions grid alsoas a means of perfoxining safe (constant g)
entries once a malfunction has been detected. These simulations
have led to the speculation that the EMS might also be used as
a backup entry ranging device in the event of a G&N malfunction.
To determine if this is a feasible conception, the Guidance and
Control Division has performed a six-degree-of-freedom entry
simulation study (reference 1).
SIMULATION TMPLIMENTATION
The implementation of the CM entry ranging simulation using the
Block II RAS was accomplished by coupling the analog solution
of the spacecraft equations of motion and digital solution of
the MIT guidance to a fixed base simulation of the CM. The
simulator contained an astronaut couch, rotational hand con-
troller, and main display console enclosed in a mockup of the
CM. The main display console contained those switches and
instruments needed to perform the entry simulation (Table 1
and figure 1). The EMS, as described in reference 2 0
 was
closely approximated by constructing NAA monitor lines
(figure 2) on pressure sensitive paper which moved vertically
accoxuaiice with the Et`7S velocity vutipuc and a stylus which
moved horizontally in accordance with the EMS g output.
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EMS RANGING LINES
Since the lines which are presently on the II40 scroll (figure 2)
are for monitoring the G&N system only, a new set of lines had
to be developed and superimposed on the scroll for the purpose
of performing entry ranging in the event of a G&N malfunction
(figure 3). The ranging lines can be broken down into two sets.
The first set is for the supercircular portion of the entry
(first pass into the atmosphere). The second is for the sub-
circular portion of the entry (second pass into the atmosphere).
The first set of lines begin at an entry velocity of 36,300 ft/sec.
The top line is simply an EMS scroll trace of a guided entry from
an initial flight angle (^(I) of 6.4° and a downrange target
of 2,500 n. mi. from an altitude of 400,000 feet. The lower line
is a guided entry with initial conditions ofkYi = 7.12 and range-
to-go (RTG) = 1,500 n. mi. There is also a line which branches off
the lower ^r:ace which is a guided entry with initial conditions of)fI = 7.12 and RTG = 2,000 n. mi. The second set of lines begin
at an EMS scroll velocity of approximately 24000 ft/sec and continue
to the end of the scroll (4,000 ft/sec). These linos ara, marked every
few inches with numbers ( g , 6, 4, 3, 2,1,0.5) which represent hundreds of
miles to go to the target. These lines are potential range lines and
indicate to the pilot how much farther the spacecraft will travel if
the pilot holds the present constant g level. For example, if the G
vs V trace crosses the line marked 11 3 11 , it would indicate to the
pilot that the spacecraft will: travel 300 n. mi. further if he held
the present g level constant for the rest of the flight. The
simulation pilots were also given a chart which presented a plot
of maximum g load vs initial flight path angle for liftup trajectories
kfigure 4").  This chart was useful to determine the lift vector
orientation during the first pass into the atmosphere. However, the
flight crew probably will have memorized the plot by flight time,,
and therefore, it would be superfluous to carry it along on the
mission.
Use of EMS Ranging Lines
The pilot in an actual entry will receive various infozuation from
the ground prior to entry. In part, this information will consist
of inertial velocity, ZrI, RTG from 400,000 feet, RTG from 0.05 g
altitude (297,431 feet), and crossrange to the right or left of
the target. He will then enter the inertia. velocity on the 34S
scroll and the RTG from the 0.05 g altitude in the RTG meter as
described in reference 2. If there has 'been a Gail failure prior
to entry and the pilot uses the CMS ranging lines, he should do the
following:
1. .Aline the spacecraXt in the entry position automatically
or manually.
2. Check the plot of maximum g vs Kf to determLie vhat
loading will be encountered if a liftup entry Is ,flown.
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3. At 0.05 g, fly liftup if l; I is stpepor than -5.8e andfly liftdown if it is shallower than -5. 8C (liftup or liftdown
should be verified with the corridor verification lights).
4. If (2) abovo indicates that more than 5g will be obtained
for a liftup entry, teen hold liftup and level off at 5g as the
g level decreases through that point. If ^ I is steeper than -5. S4°
but (2) above indicates that 5 g will not be reached with liftup,
then modulates the lift vector (starting just before the maximum
liftup g 18 obtained) and level off at 5g, If el is shallower
than -5,84 , hold liftdown and level off at 5g.
5. Continue to hold a 5g level until the G vs V trace approaches
the exit rays (2,500 n, mi., 2,000 n. mi., and 1,500 n. mi.). Then,
depending on the ground information as to the RTG from /.,.00,000 feet,
allow the g level to decrease so that the EMS trace of G vs V follows
the appropriate line, For example, if the RTG is 2,200 n. mi. at
1x.00,000 feet, modulate the lift vector such that the trace will pass
parallel to and between the 2,500 n, mi. and the 2,000 n. mi. exit
rays. This assures that the spacecraft will have the correct flight
path angle and velocity during the ballistic portion of the trajectory
(between the first and second pass into the atmosphere).
6. during tge ballistic portion of the flight (less than 1g)
hold either a +90 or -90 lift vector orientation if the G vs V
trace paralled the correct exit ray and was essentially in the correct
location. If the G vs V trace was above the correct location, fly
liftdown. If the trace is low, fly liftup. Hold the above lift
vector orientation until the g level begins to build up again. Of
c i"aJ. ao, t here may b some tract j ector.L6 ^ tv 5-auL targU tU Where Tine
spacecraft never gets below a 1g level after entering the atmosphere,
7. Once the g level starts to 1,iild up during the second pass
into 'the atmosphere, fly liftup until the g level builds to a
maximum. At this point, check the RTG meter against thb potential
RTG lines. If they agree, hold that g level to the end of the run.
Of course, small adjhustments in g level can be made as the trace
passes through the successive potential RTG lines. If the RTG
meter and the potential RTG lines do not agree, modulate the lift
vector until they do agree and then try to hold a constant g level
to the end of the flight. The EMS scroll ends at a velocity of
42 000 ft/sge. However, the flight path angle of the spacecraft Is
almost -90 at that point, and there Is very little ranging that can
be done from that point on.
It should be noted that there is no crossrange indication onboard
the spacecraft during a G&T failure, and therefore, the pilot must
"mentally integrate" this quantity during the flight and m^,dulate
the .lift vector from side to side to hold the crossrange error at a
minimum. Also, for long range targets, the spacecraft may skip (pass
amn"-OIL All"
up through the 0.05 g altitude) and the pilot should then go to
an entry attitv.debosition with the lift vector up (either automat-
ically or mantudy) until the 0.05 g light comes on again. An R4S
scroll trace for an entry of 61 = 6,4 and RTG = 2,200 n. mi. using
the MS for backup ranging Is shown In figure 5.
TEST MJNS
The si=lation test runs began at an altitude of 400,000 feet and
an inertial velocity of 36,300 ft/sec. The vehlele was assumed to
be at the correct entry attitude in pitch and yaw with the liftup,
The on3l.y conditions that were varied were initial flight path angle
( XI ) and range-to-go to the target (RTG), All piloted runs were
flown under manual control utilizing single-system ROS. Manual
control was exercised with either G&N roll steering signals (ENS
for monitoring), which was termed "Manual G&N mode l', or without
G&N roll steering signals (343 for prime control), which was termed
UMS backup model'.
Various C&N -failures were also introduced during the manual GO
modes. The first mkArix of test runs assumed that the G&N has
falled prior to 0.05, but the attitude hold capability still
existed (above 0.05g . The test subjects flew a3these ruffs In_;
the EMS back-up mode. ThejYI was varied :from -5.2 to -7,1e
and the RTG was varied from '1,500n, mi. to 2,500 n. mi. (total of
35 runs for each simulation pilot) & There were four test subjects(three from FOSD and one from WD). Each pilot was given ample
training time to familiarize himsel'L with the system before he
8+.o " oA +.hm test v	 Im	
I ^	
ri 4 '1 vi"r% ^ -n4 ^ .",;,dd4 +4 .^V% 4-^ t 
I	 f	 JJ.A,.U%,J.IA&	 U WA.WAA %MI	 %J%JU1	 iW6A-.A.%4.?6 W
to 0.05g there were a number of runs where the GO failure was
introduced after 0.05g. These runs were broken down into two
categories: (1) complete GO failures (loss of computer), and (2)
erroneous steering commands.
It should be noted that the G&N failures In category (2) do not
necessarily violate NAA monitor lines. For example, the target
may be at a RTG of 2 0 :500 n. r4, and the steering signals could
direct the vehicle to a RTG of 1,500 n. mi. without violating theNAA monitor. lines. However ., the G va V trace over the 94S ranging
lines would Indicate a G&N malfunction quite early in the entry,
5
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
G&N Malfu.n^tions Prior to 0.058
The results of the study of G&N malfunctions prior to 0.05g are based on
four pilots who made 35 runs eacho The data were statistically evaluated
and are presented as the mean, 1 T , and 30( miss distances for downrange(DR), crossrange (OR), and total vector C (DR)2 + (CR)2
	 (Table 11).
For comparison, the same miss distances are also presented for automatic
G&N entries.
A, normality check of the miss distance data performbd by G&CD showed the
data to be not-normal. Therefore, a 3 O' deviat-lorw can only be considered
an 89% probability of occurrence rather than 99.74%. Or more specifically,
If a G&N failure occurs prior to 0,05g and the pilot used the 24S backup
mode for entry ranging, there is an 8% probability that the spacecraft
will land within 161 n. mi. of the mean miss distance (50 n. mi.).
The above miss distances are considered quite accurate; howevero there are
some qualifications that must be considered:
1. During the simtaation, it was assumed that all other active
systems (except the G&N) were operational. For example, control of
the spacecraft would become quite difficult if the RCS system failed
while flying the EMS backup mode.
6
2. The L/D used in the simulation was a
L/D values from .25 to .4 were tested. L/D vi
cult to fly and increased  the miss distances.
the response of the spacecraft to lift vector
control task easier. (Changes in L/D from .3
34S backup ranging lines.)
constant . 341 a However,
dues 'below .3 ware diffi-
L/D above .341 increased
orientatiuns and made the
to .5 do not change the
3. The RTG meter used in the simulAtion portrayed the true ground
RTG of the target. Therefore, the present RTG meter error (approximat e-ily
40 n. mi.) should be added to the above numbers. However, this RTG error
could be greatly reduced by either: (a) entering an RTG number,  transmitted
from the lZround that includes -the curvature of the flight or (b) include
some sImple logic in the RTG meter that would represent the true ground
RTG to the target. If (1) above is used, the RTG number (including flight
curvature) should be based on the RTG from the .05B altitude (29'x* 131 feet)
to 1 00,000 feet. The reason for the 100,000 foot altitude limit is that
the spacecraft will be coming almost straight down at that', point, but the
RTG meter would still be decreasing. The pilot should take the RTG meter
reading at 100,000 feet and fly constant lift vector orientation of either
Oo (lift downrange) or 1800 (lift uprange) depending whether the spacecraft
Is short of the target or has passed the target. It should be noted that
if the pilot holds a constant lift vector orientation of 1800 from an
altitude of 100,000 feet down to drogue chute deployment, the g level
will not Increase significantly because o pt" the relatively low terminal
velocity of the spacecraft.
4, It is, of course, essential that the W work correct ly for
the miss distances to be accurate. However, initial volocity errors(difference between spacecraft veloc ,,`-,y and EMS scroll velocity) up
to 300 ft/sec, indicated g loading errors of 5%, and off.-nominal
atmospheric quantities had no effect on the alzol.ation results. These
errors are well within the design specification of the EMS. It should
also be noted that the EMS bacloap ranging lines are independent of
initial velocity. Therefore, 1,he spacecraft can enter tho atm sphere
at any velocity (even subeircul.ar) . As bong a ►a this velocity is
entered can the EMS scroll, the t aclzup ranging lines will still be
valid.
5. Each simulation run was terminated at an altitude of 100,OOOo
feet mince at tint point, the rolative ^'Ught path angle is almost -90
However, there is come ranging that can be accomplished from an alti-
tude of 100,000 feet down to drogue chute depluyment. Therefore, the
E0 backup miss distances urould be smaller if the s,%naation had been
run to touchdown,)
G&N Wfunctions After 0.058
The results of G&N malfunctions after 0.05g Lo eosentially the game as
that prior to .05g as long as the malfunction is instantaneous and
detectable. For example, if the spacecraft is following a nominal
guided entry either in the automatic or manual G&N modes and the
computer f1goes out", the pilot simply takes control manually and
completes the entry using the EIS backing ranging lines. The transi-
tion between the guided entry and the EMS backup entry is of no
voncor n bacau ,e the ^a grog a ernes are baoed on guided entries and
therefore completely compatible. However, if the malfunction causes
erroneous steering signals, the results are quite different. As
mentioned before, the guidance could direct the spacecraft to a
1,500 n, mi. touchdown point while the desired target is 2,500 n. mi.
and never violate NAA monitoring lines. The pilot probably would
detect the failure even without the EMS backup ranging lines, but
the addition of these lines would certainly enhance his monitoring
capability. This is especially true during the terminal portion
of -the entry since as the G vs V trace passes over the potential
ranging line, a quick check can be made with the RTG meter. Of
course, it would depend upon how closely the pilot was monitoring
the EMS scroll and when he would take over the guided entry, but
from the simulation pilot performance, a miss distance of approximately
500 n. mi. can be detected early in the entry and 200 n. mi. during the
term:Wal portion of the entry. Therefore, a malfunction of this type
could cause a touchdown miss distance of approximately 500 n. mi.
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aAnother type of malfunction that was investigated was an erroneous
steering signal after .05g which violates NAA monJtoring lines. In
most cases, if the G vs V trace violates a skip line and the pilot
takes over immediately, he can recover and use the DDS backup lines
to guide the vehicle to the target. However, during the simulation,
It was discovered that very shallow entries (YI = 5.2 0 ) could violate
the NAA skip monitor lines early in the trajectory, and the pilot would
take over and fly lift vector down and not capture the atmosphere (exit
the atmosphere at a supercircular velocity). A G vs V plot of such a
trajectory is shown in fi e 6. To eliminate this possibly catastrophic
condition, a constant (K in the MIT guidance equations was changed from
a value of 2 to 2.7. Thks required that for shallow entries the lift
vector remain down until the g level reached 2.7g before a liftup command
could be given. A trajectory showing this malfunction with K A = 2.7 and
subsequent recovery is also shown in figure 6. Another good reason to
change KA to 2.7 is heat shield '.imitations. Figure 7 shows a G vs V
plot of two guided entrres with shallow initial flight paths and long
range targets using KA = 2 and KA = 2.7. It can be seen that the
trajectory using KA = 2 violates the upper heat shield boundary while
the trajectory using KA = 2.7 is below the boundary during most of the
V
ight. In addition to changing KA to 2.7, all entries shallower than
I = -5.84o should enter the atmosphere with liftdown Initially. This
will also insure that the skip lines are not violated early in the
flight. The above two changes (KA = 2.7 and liftdown Y I^ -5. 8e) are
MIT software changes. Also, the g level on the EMS corridor verifica-
tion lights must be set to correspond to the liftdown )f I } -5.84 0 (EMS
hardware change) . Anion will be taken to try and have these feathers
Included in the Block II CM series.
During previous EMS simulation studies, if the G vs V trace becomes
almost parallel to a skip line, the pilot sometimes took over a good
run. This was also true during the latest GOD simulation. Howej,er,
during thl.a simulation study, the pilot would take over and make only
minor corrections so the G vs V trace would parallel the correct exit
ray instead of flying a constant g profile as was the procedure during
the previous studies. Also, if the pilot did take over a good run, he
would usually notice that the guidance commands from the computer
continued to be essentially the same as the maneuvers used to fly
the EMS backing ranging lines. When this situation existed, the pilot
would switch back o the automatic mode and continue to monitor the
entry.
G&N Malfunctions Causing Excessive g Loadings
A mal),nction which causes excessive g loading can also 'be overcome with
a simple pilot procedure. This excessive g malfunction occurs when the
spacecraft is under a high e level (6g) and a liftdown command is received
from the computer. If the pilot waits for the G vs V trace to violate a
g line (could be $g), the spacecraft may encounter g levels as high as 12g.
A simple procedure to avoid this is to instruct the pilot when the spacecraft
Is at a 6g level or greater, any command other than liftup ±90 0
 is erroneous,
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and he should take ovor manually. This would require no software. ,ange
in the MIT guidance as guidance commands above 5.5 g must be between
zero and positive lift.
Fuel Usage
.Another result that should be mentioned is the use of fuel. There were
some assumptions made in the simulation of the RCS and digital
autopilot which are mentioned in reference 1. Therefore, the actual
fuel numbers are not exactly correct. However, a comparison of the
numbers should be of some importance. An upper limit of fuel usage
for the various control modes is as follows:
(1) automatic and manual G0 ,52-.1
 60 lb.
(2) constant g and EMS backup X100 lb.
It should be noted from the above fuel figures that safe entries
(constant g) and EMS backup ranging entries use considerably more
fuel than guided entries and therefore the fuel budget must be
based on the backup entry mode rather than trying to minimize fuel
consumption with an optimum digital-autopilot in the automatic
mode.
Skip Trajectories
A few of the simulation pilots have recommended that skip trajectories
(skip above the .05 g altitude) be eliminated from FMS backup
rar+ging %r of erences 3 and 4) . The main objection seems to be that
when the spacecraft passes above the 0.05 g altitude it must go
into attitude hold, either automatically or manually, until the
spacecraft reenters the atmosphere. Since the computer may be
ffoutff , the automatic attitude hold would not include the range
angle traveled from the initial entry po;nt to the present position.
However, this can only be as large as 26 and because of the rate
damping capabilities of the CM the spacecraft would attain the correct
trim attitude shortly after 0.05 g on the second pass into the
atmosphere (reference 5). :in fact, the attitude hold maneuver
during skip (either automatically or manually) is essentially the
same as it would be prior to 0.05 g during the initial entry.
Therefore, there seems to be no reason to eliminate the skip type
entries.
CONCLUDING RKURKS
Results of the simulation study may be summarized as follows:
(1) If a detectable G&N malfunction occurs before 0.05 g and
the pilot flies the 24S backup ranging lines, there is
an 59% probability that the spacecraft will land within
161 n. mi. of the mean miss distance of 50 n. mits (assuming
a correct RTG meter and no other failures).
10
(2) If an instantaneous and detectable malfunction occurs after 0.05 g,
the results are the same as (1) above.
(3) If erroneous steering commands are present during entry that do
not cause violation of the NAA monitoring lines, a miss distance
of approximately 500 n. mi. could be encountered.
(4) If erroneous steering commands are present during entry that do
cause violation of the NAA monitoring lines and the pilot takes
over immediately, he can usually maneuver the spacecraft to the target
area if the following is true:
(a) The constant K  is equal to 2.7 in the MIT guidance equations
(b) If th8 limiting lift down flight path angle is set at
-5.84 .
(c) The FMS corridor verification lights agree with 4-b above.
(5) Trajectories using KA = 2.7 do not violate the upper heat shield
boundary.
(b) The EMS backup ranging lines are very useful for entry monitoring
and in the event the pilot takes over a good run he can return to
automatic control.
(7) Safe entries (constant g) and EMS backup ranging entries use
considerably more fuel than guided entries.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following is a list of recommendations based on the CzO simulation study
of entry ranging using the CM Block II EMS:
(1) The FMS backup ranging lines (figure 3) should be inch-d.ed on all
Block II CM-FMS. These lines should be a different color than the
NAA monitor lanes.
(2) Upper and lower heat shield boundary lines (figure 7) be included
on all Block, II CM-EMS. These lines should be a different color
than the NAA monitor lines and the FMS backup ranging lines.
(3) The MIT entry guidance program be changed to include K A = 2.7 and
the flight path angle which determines lift up or lift down entries
be set at -5. $4 o
(4) The FMS corridor verification light be adjusted to reflect (3)
above (FMS hardware change).
(5) The fuel budget be based on backup entries procedures.
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(6) Various procedures and techniques mentioned in the text of this
paper be included in the Block II flights.
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TABLE II - MEAN, STANDARD, AND 3Or MISS DISTA14CES FOR
EMS BACKUP AND AUTOMATIC RANGING
Mode Mean
n mi
Standard
Deviation
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3 
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n miTarget Error
EMS Backup
Downrange 33.9 56.2 168.6
Crossrange 25.1 20.8 62.4
Vector 49.9 53.6 160.8
Automatic
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Crossrange 4. 18 1	 8 5.4
Vector 8.02 4.5 13.5
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Figure 2 - NAA GO monitor lines
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Figure 3 - EMS backup ranging lines
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Figure 7 - Upper and lower heat shield boundaries
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